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LARA, LAWRENCE, SUPREME COURT
LITIGATION, AND LESSONS FROM
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Kevin K. Washburn*
United States v. Lara' was hailed as a victory for Indian tribes because it
upheld tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. Lawrence v. Texas2
was hailed as a victory for the gay rights movement because it upheld the due
process right of gays to be protected from criminal prosecutions for consensual
sexual acts done in private within their own homes. Despite dramatically different
contexts, the two cases share a common thread: both are cases in which interested
groups achieved important successes by marshalling broad support for their
arguments at the briefing stage which helped pave the way for Supreme Court
victory. In each case, advocates received support from unlikely sources. This
modest link provides an opportunity to examine some aspects of the strategies
employed in the Supreme Court litigation in the Lara and Lawrence cases and to
evaluate how and whether Indian tribes can adapt successful legal strategies of the
gay rights movement or other social movements.5
In a series of recent articles William Eskridge has documented the
development of constitutional legal strategies during the past century by the gay
rights movement, as well as the civil rights movement and the women's rights
6
movement, and has evaluated their successes. Although these movements differ
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The author appreciates the
comments and suggestions of John Dossett, Alex Johnson, Riyaz Kanji, and Miranda McGowan, and
the hard work of his research assistant Chloe Thompson. Errors are the author's alone.
1. 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004).
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. Three briefs were filed in the Lara case in support of the tribal position; the briefs were the
result of a coordinated effort between amici consisting of eight states, eighteen tribes, and the National
Congress of American Indians. See infra nn. 24, 33-34. Sixteen briefs were filed in the Lawrence case
in support of the gay individuals; the amici filing these briefs were even more numerous, and included
many powerful organizations. See 539 U.S. at 561-62 (listed in footnote).
4. For example, states are not always likely to align their interests with tribes, as some did in Lara.
The amici in the Lawrence case include several somewhat surprising organizations.
5. The notion is not as creative as one might think. While drafting this essay, I received in the mail
a copy of a reprint from a colleague who has suggested the converse, i.e., that the gay rights movement
may well have something to learn from Indian law. See Robert Laurence, What Could American
Indian Law Possibly Have to Do with the Issue of Gay-Marriage Recognition?: Definitional
Jurisprudence, Equal Protection and Full Faith and Credit, 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 563 (2004).
6. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2062, 2062 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, IBSMs]. See
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in several fundamental respects from the tribal sovereignty movement, tribes and
these identity-based social movements have faced the same challenge: how to
convince the Supreme Court to accept their respective views of their status within
the United States and the Constitution. With the notion that the work of these
movements might be able to inform Indian legal strategists, this essay will search
Professor Eskridge's work for simple insights that might be useful in the field of
Indian law and for the tribal sovereignty movement. It will first briefly discuss
Lara and Lawrence and the link between the two cases. It will then summarize
some insights from Professor Eskridge and comment on their relevance to Indian
tribes.
I. LARA AND UNIFIED INDIAN SUPREME COURT STRATEGY
Lara was nominally a criminal case involving the issue of whether an Indian
defendant could be prosecuted by the federal government following a tribal
prosecution by a tribe not his own.7 Since he was not a member of the tribe that
prosecuted the original offense, the defendant argued that the tribal prosecution
had been authorized by federal law." And if it had been so authorized, the
defendant argued, the initial tribal prosecution was equivalent to a federal
prosecution and the subsequent federal prosecution was therefore invalid under
the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause.9 The case raised serious issues of
congressional authority, inherent tribal power, and the intersection of two
important American legal constructs. The case posed the following question:
When Congress acts to restore the power of Indian tribes to prosecute non-
member Indians, is that action a delegation of federal authority that would create,
in essence, a federal prosecution by Indian tribes acting pursuant to the law? Or,
on the other hand, is the congressional action simply a recognition of preexisting
and inherent tribal authority that would not constitute federal jeopardy?'
The United States argued that Congress has restored to the tribes a
sovereign power that predates the Constitution and laws of the United States and
that this tribal sovereign power derives from a source independent of those laws.1'
This argument was perhaps most elegantly summarized in a government brief in a
similar case in the Seventh Circuit that preceded Lara:
Tribal sovereignty is a river flowing from a natural source, channeled within the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, enlarged or obstructed by the will of
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 419 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due
Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1183 (2000) (comparing the relative utility
of due process and equal protection arguments by subordinated groups).
7. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1628.
8. Id. at 1632. See also 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000) (recognizing the "inherent power of Indian
tribes.., to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians").
9. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1631. Since this piece is being published as part of a symposium on Lara, the
author does not feel obliged to recount at length the facts or the legal background of the case.
10. Id. at 1632.
11. Petr. Br. at 11, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628.
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Congress. When Congress removes an obstruction, tribal sovereignty flows free of
it. 12
Because Lara was a federal criminal case, no tribe was a party to the case.
However, the issues at stake went to the heart of tribal sovereignty, causing tribal
governments to worry about the outcome and leading them to participate in the
• 13
case as amic.
Like Indian tribes, opponents of tribal sovereignty were interested in the
case as well. Anti-tribal interest groups filed numerous amicus briefs in the case,
generally asking the Court to decide that tribal sovereignty was not broad enough
to support criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who was not a member of the
tribe.'4 With the exception of a brief filed by the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"), most of the defendant's amici directed their
arguments toward discrediting tribal justice systems rather than supporting the
defendant Lara. i5 Because these briefs tended to present positions well outside of
the mainstream of federal Indian law jurisprudence, these briefs were not
particularly threatening to tribal sovereignty.1
6
However, one amicus brief caused significant worry. The states of Idaho,
Alabama, Louisiana, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Utah ("Idaho brief") filed a
brief that nominally supported the position of the United States that Lara had no
valid double jeopardy claim in this case, but nevertheless took a position that was
hostile to Indian tribes.17 Idaho and these other states asserted that the authority
of Congress to restore an inherent tribal power was a "grave" issue.' They
"profoundly disagree[d]"' 9 with the position that Congress has the power to
restore a tribe's inherent authority2 and argued that this power must be found
unconstitutional.El
12. Petr. Br. at 7, U.S. v. Long, 324 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2003).
13. See e.g. Michael Moreland, The Native Voice, For All Our Relations, "We Never Give Up": An
Interview with John E. Echohawk, http://www.native-voice.comlfullstory.cfm?ID=666 (accessed Oct.
22, 2004) (discussing the importance of Lara to tribes).
14. Four amicus briefs were filed in support of the defendant Billy Jo Lara. The amici were the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Br. of Amicus Curiae Natl. Assn. of Crim. Def.
Law., Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628; the Citizens Equal Rights Foundation, Br. of Amicus Curiae Citizens
Equal Rights Found., Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 [hereinafter CERF Br.]; Lewis County, Idaho, Mille Lacs
County, Minnesota, and Thurston County, Nebraska, Br. of Amici Curiae Lewis County, Idaho, Mille
Lacs County, Minn., & Thurston County, Neb., Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 [hereinafter Counties Br.]; and
Thomas Lee Morris, Elizabeth S. Morris, and Roland J. Morris, Br. of Amicus Curiae Thomas Lee
Morris, Elizabeth E. Morris, & Roland J. Morris, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 [hereinafter Morris Br.].
15. See e.g. CERF Br., supra n. 14, at 11 (emphasizing that tribal courts do not provide full
constitutional protections).
16. See e.g. Counties Br., supra n. 14, at 1 (challenging tribal jurisdiction by asserting that until
recently, "[n]o one maintained that the original reservations still existed"); CERF Br., supra n. 14, at 1
(also using the term "original reservations," as well as implying that tribal courts abridge the rights of
U.S. citizens); Morris Br., supra n. 14, at 20 n. 10 (comparing blood quantum standards for enrollment
in an Indian tribe to the Nazis' treatment of persons with Jewish blood).
17. Br. of Amicus Curiae States of Idaho, Ala., La., Neb., S.D., and Utah, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628
[hereinafter Idaho Br.].
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3-4. The brief argued that the states' chief interest was raising "criminal process-related
concerns" on behalf of their citizens to prevent these citizens from being subjected to treatment that
TULSA LAW REVIEW
It should be no surprise why this brief might be particularly worrisome to
tribes. A very large body of the Court's jurisprudence has been developed in
cases in which states and tribes are opponents. Given the strong support for
states' rights in the jurisprudence of one faction of the Supreme Court, a
significant concern by states might motivate some members of the Court to rule in
favor of the states and against the tribes. In tribe-versus-state cases, tribes have
often found themselves on the losing end. Indeed, in cases involving tribes-versus-
anyone in recent years, tribal victories have been the exception. The tribal win-
loss record is so bad that Professor David Getches recently noted that convicted
criminal defendants have had a better chance than Indian tribes of prevailing in
the Supreme Court in recent terms.23 Under these circumstances, a case in which
states and criminal defense lawyers line up together against tribes might present a
particularly serious cause for concern.
Yet this risk was dramatically addressed by the filing of a brief by several
other states in support of tribal sovereign authority to prosecute non-member
Indians. This brief in support of tribal sovereignty, which was filed by eight states
led by the State of Washington, offered unqualified support for the position of the
United States in favor of Congress's power to restore inherent tribal sovereignty."
Washington's brief on behalf of itself and Arizona, California, Colorado,
Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, and Oregon effectively nullified any
presumption that might have arisen from the Idaho brief that there was unified
state opposition to tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.
The Washington brief provided an important policy viewpoint in the briefing
by discussing the important partnership that those states have developed with
Indian tribes to provide effective law enforcement 2' and by agreeing that the
restoration of inherent tribal power over non-member Indians was a valid exercise
of Congress's power in Indian affairs.26 These states, many of which are larger and
more influential than those that joined the Idaho brief, also addressed important
public safety issues. For example, they noted that it is very common for non-
member Indians to reside on reservations. They also highlighted the jurisdictional
might violate criminal procedural protections found in the Bill of Rights (which do not apply to tribes).
Given the vigorousness with which some of these same states opposed incorporation of the Bill of
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment, their position is more than a little ironic. Id. at 1; see e.g.
Duncan v. La., 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that a defendant facing a possible sentence of two years
plus fine was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury trial); see also Turner v.
Dept. of Empl. Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment required a more
individualized means to achieve legitimate state ends in the case of a Utah statute presuming the
incapacitation of pregnant women).
21. Idaho Br., supra n. 17, at 2-4.
22. See generally John P. Lavelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte Young,
Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 787
(1999).
23. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-
Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 281 (2001).
24. Br. of Amici Curiae States of Wash, Ariz., Cal., Colo., Mich., Mont., N.M., and Or., Lara, 124 S.
Ct. 1628 [hereinafter Washington Br.].
25. Id. at 1.
26. Id. at 1-2.
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gap that might therefore arise in the absence of tribal authority to prosecute non-
member Indians.27  According to the Washington brief, state interests in good
government and effective law enforcement favored the position of the United
States and Indian tribes."8
Aside from the substantive value of the arguments, the filing of the
Washington brief made clear that large and sophisticated Western states
supported the tribal position and that Lara was not simply a tribe-versus-state
case, dramatically changing the complexion and posture of the case before the
Court. A states' rights court might nevertheless have adopted a states' rights
position. But, in light of the fact that more states supported the tribal position
than opposed it, such a position by the Supreme Court might ultimately have been
a stronger statement of federal paternalism than federalism. Strong state support
for the tribal position thus placed the states' rights faction of the Court in an
awkward position and undermined its ability to persuade moderate justices.
Given the importance of this brief, it is worth examining the briefing strategy
that gave rise to its filing. The Washington brief was the capstone of a Supreme
Court strategy that had been several years in the making. Through the 1990s,
Indian tribes worried about the Supreme Court as it became clear that the
Supreme Court was no longer the chief protector of important principles of tribal
sovereignty, and was becoming a forum where it was difficult for tribes to
prevail. 29 Though tribes knew intuitively that the Court was becoming a hostile
environment, the research of Professor Getches painted an alarming picture of the
tribal success rate before the Supreme Court. It no doubt served to confirm their
suspicions.3 ° A plan of action began to form.
In 2001, the National Congress of American Indians ("NCAI") and the
Native American Rights Fund ("NARF") joined together to form a tribal
Supreme Court Project ("Project"). 31 The Project worked to coordinate briefing
in cases before the Supreme Court. In Lara, Project lawyers pursued a three-
32pronged strategy.
27. Id. at 2-7.
28. Id. at 6-8.
29. Compare e.g. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); Cal. v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470
U,S. 226 (1985); with e.g. Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997); Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Fl., 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See also Edwin Kneedler, Indian Law in the
Last Thirty Years: How Cases Get to the Supreme Court and How They Are Briefed, 28 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 274, 274-75 (2004) ("The Supreme Court in the late Seventies and through, I would say, the mid-
to late Eighties, was particularly supportive of Indian tribes and Indian people .... ").
30. Getches, supra n. 23, at 281. Getches notes that three eeneral trends in the Court in recent
years are that "fvlirtuallv without exception, state interests prevail: attempts to protect specific rights
of racial minorities fail; and mainstream values are protected." Id. at 268. He also lists some of the
setbacks tribes have experienced in the Rehnquist Court. Id. at 282-83.
31. See Moreland, supra n. 13; see also Native Am. Rights Fund, Tribal Supreme Court Project,
http://doc.narf.org/sc/index.html (accessed Oct. 23, 2004).
32. Memo. from Tex Hall, Pres., Natl. Cong. of Am. Indians & John Echohawk, Exec. Dir., Native
Am. Rights Fund, to Tribal Leadership, Tribal Supreme Court Project: U.S. v. Lara Raises Significant
Issues for Tribal Sovereignty 2 (Aug. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Memorandum] (available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.orgflegal/sovereignty/laramemo.pdf.).
2004]
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First, rather than submitting numerous independent and uncoordinated
briefs, Project lawyers asked tribes to adopt a joint collaborative strategy in
briefing this case; in the end, eighteen tribes coordinated with Project lawyers
from NARF and filed a single brief.33 The tribal brief focused on the factual
context of the case and explained the practical importance of tribal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians. Second, Project lawyers retained experienced
Supreme Court counsel to file a brief that focused on key legal principles.34 This
brief, filed on behalf of NCAI, the largest tribal advocacy group in the United
States, addressed the source of tribal sovereignty and the role of Congress in
defining it. Finally, Project lawyers asked tribes to urge their respective states'
attorneys general to coordinate in filing a states' brief supporting the tribe's
position, a strategy that resulted in the Washington brief.35
As a result of this strategy, a total of three strong and well-coordinated
amicus briefs were filed in support of the tribal position and the United States.
From a strategic point of view, the Washington brief was a signal achievement.
The end result, of course, was that the United States and the tribes were successful
in Lara, with the Supreme Court holding that Congress has the power to recognize
inherent tribal criminal authority over non-member Indians.36
In Supreme Court litigation strategy, Lara offers several lessons. First, it
shows the power of a coordinated approach to litigation in the Supreme Court.
Tribes have never effectively cooperated to insure that briefs were carefully
constructed to cover specific important areas of law and policy. While this may
have happened informally on occasion, sovereign tribes have maintained fierce
independence of one another. In contrast, state attorneys general have
cooperated for decades,37 with the result that states have stood together in
Supreme Court litigation far better than tribes have. Lara shows that tribes do
well when they are disciplined, coordinated, thorough, and sophisticated in
presenting cases before the Supreme Court.
Second, tribes have long had the problem of not being able to effectively
coordinate which cases go up for Supreme Court review. Since "hard cases make
bad law," 38 tribes have often been at a handicap; many of the legal issues that
reach the Court are set within factual circumstances that do not present the issues
in a favorable light. It often seems to be the cases with the worst facts that make it
33. Br. of Amici Curiae on Behalf of Eighteen Am. Indian Tribes, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 [hereinafter
Tribal Br. ].
34. Br. of Amicus Curiae Natl. Cong. of Am. Indians, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628. Veteran Supreme
Court litigator Carter G. Phillips was Counsel of Record.
35. Memorandum, supra n. 32.
36. 124 S. Ct. at 1639.
37. Under the auspices of the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG"), the states
have long had their own Supreme Court Project. Under this program, six attorneys from various
attorneys general's offices spend one year in the NAAG's office in Washington, D.C., on detail from
their home office. They spend the year attending Supreme Court arguments, learning about Supreme
Court practice, coordinating helpful amicus briefs from state governments nationwide, and meeting
attorneys from state attorneys general's offices who come to Washington to argue cases.
38. Cf N. Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., White, C.J., & Peckham, J.,
dissenting) ("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
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to the Supreme Court.39 Lara was the exception. Billy Jo Lara, a Turtle Mountain
Chippewa Band member, had voluntarily moved to the Spirit Lake Reservation
and chosen to live within that community. 4° He married a Spirit Lake tribal
member and fathered two children there.4' He also took advantage of a multitude
of government services for Indians on the reservation. 42 Because of repeated
violations of tribal laws, including domestic abuse laws, the tribe conducted
proceedings to exclude him from the reservation.43 In the course of an arrest for
trespassing on the reservation in violation of the exclusion order, Lara struck a
Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") officer.44 He was prosecuted and convicted in
tribal court.
45
For institutional reasons, it is highly unusual for the Department of Justice to
decline prosecution of a suspect who has assaulted a federal law enforcement
officer. Thus, for striking the BIA officer, Lara was also prosecuted and convicted
by federal authorities in federal court.46 Because the federal prosecution was the
vehicle for the case to travel to the Supreme Court, it was the Solicitor General's
office that made the decision as to whether to seek certiorari. That office is both
wise and savvy in choosing cases to take to the Supreme Court and it chose well
here. The case exemplified why it makes sense, from a practical standpoint, to
allow tribal jurisdiction over other Indians living in their midst, which was well-
highlighted in one of the amicus briefs.4 ' Thus, perhaps one lesson from Lara is
that tribes must use the same kind of care that the Solicitor General uses in
choosing which cases to attempt to take to the Court.
The Project's success in Lara is a quantum leap forward in the presentation
of Indian law cases in the Supreme Court. It dramatically demonstrates the
importance of the Project to tribal governments in helping to shepherd Indian law
in a more positive direction. With this victory, tribes learned how much more
effective they can be when they adopt a unified and coherent briefing strategy.
Even in a legal forum that is nominally outside the political context, their political
power can be brought to bear. To a tremendous degree, tribes are beginning to
flex their muscles not only as independent sovereign governments but also as
important players within the state political scene.4" As tribes have become more
39. Perhaps the worst in recent years was C & L Enter. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001) (holding that an arbitration clause constituted a waiver of sovereign
immunity).
40. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1631.
41. Id. See also Tribal Br., supra n. 33, at 4.
42. Tribal Br., supra n. 33, at 4-5.
43. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1631. See also Tribal Br., supra n. 33, at 5.
44. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1631. See also Tribal Br., supra n. 33, at 6.
45. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1631. See also Tribal Br., supra n. 33, at 6-7. The tribes also note that Lara
does not challenge the tribal court conviction. Id. at 7.
46. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1631. See also Tribal Br., supra n. 33, at 7.
47. Tribal Br., supra n. 33, at 4-12. Consider how the complexion of the case might have differed if
Lara had been an urban Indian with no ties to the tribe, who was merely driving on a state highway
through the reservation on a family vacation at the time of the altercation.
48. John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in American
Politics: A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Policy 533, 533 (2001).
20041
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prominent players in state government, state interests vis-A-vis tribes are no longer
as monolithic as they have been in the past. By convincing some states to join the
tribal sovereignty cause, tribes transformed some of their traditional opponents
into powerful allies that helped to neutralize the opposition of those states that
chose to remain tribal foes.
This success begs Indian legal strategists to begin to think about other ways
to advance tribal litigation before the Supreme Court. To that end, tribes would
do well to consider the strategies of similarly situated groups, such as the strategies
that led to the victory for the gay rights movement in Lawrence v. Texas.
II. LAWRENCE, LIBERTY AND LIBERTARIANS
Like Lara, Lawrence was a remarkable success achieved through careful
planning and an appeal to an unlikely ally at the briefing stage. Lawrence
involved the prosecution by Texas officials of two gay men for engaging in
consensual sexual relations with one another in the privacy of one's apartment.49
The case reached the Supreme Court when the men brought equal protection and
substantive due process challenges to the Texas statute criminalizing certain
sexual conduct between members of the same sex.50
Lawrence seems to have been the case that gay rights legal strategists had
been awaiting, ready to pounce." Like Lara, it offered attractive facts and it
opened the door to a fruitful legal strategy. In his work evaluating the progress of
social movements, Professor William Eskridge had written that the Supreme
Court's libertarian decisions had been among the most important cases for
women, people of color, and gays. 2 Lawrence seemed to be the perfect case to
marry libertarianism with the gay rights agenda. To put this theory into action,
Professor Eskridge left the ivory tower and became an advocate and legal
strategist in the Supreme Court briefing on Lawrence. On behalf of the CATO
Institute, a public policy foundation "dedicated to advancing the principles of
individual liberty," Eskridge filed a brief arguing that the Texas law at issue in
the case "invade[d] fundamental liberties, including personal security, the sanctity
of the home, and interpersonal relations.
5 4
If Eskridge was the matchmaker in the marriage of convenience between
libertarianism and the gay rights movement, Justice Kennedy officiated at the
wedding ceremony. With Justice Kennedy authoring the majority opinion, a total
of six justices sided with the defendant against Texas and found the statute
unconstitutional. Four justices joined Justice Kennedy's opinion and held that the
statute violated the substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth
49. 539 U.S. at 562-63.
50. Id. at 562-64.
51. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the
Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1021, 1021 (2004).
52. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2386.
53. Br. of Amicus Curiae CATO Inst. at 1, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 [hereinafter CATO Br.].
54. Id. at 2.
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Amendment.55 One other member of the Court, Justice O'Connor, opined that
the statute violated equal protection and thus she concurred in the result reached
by the Kennedy-led majority.56
To reach its conclusion, the Court explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,57
a fairly recent case58 that had been a serious obstacle to the gay rights movement.
In overruling Bowers, Lawrence represented the equivalent of a bases-loaded
home run, a dramatic transformation of the constitutional legal regime faced by
the gay rights movement.
The case also constituted a strong validation of the gay rights movement's
(and Professor Eskridge's) legal strategy. In writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy began with a paragraph that could have been adapted directly from the
CATO brief:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling
or other private places .... Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions.59
In helping the gay rights movement achieve this victory, the CATO brief was
important in several respects. First, it provided substantive arguments that split
libertarian conservatives away from religious or even states' rights conservatives,
and appealed to still somewhat nascent constitutional norms related to privacy. It
also sent the more subtle message that support for gay rights was not limited to a
radical fringe group, or even to liberal groups, but was widespread, a factor that
Eskridge believes was key to the decision.6°
III. LEGAL STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY THE GREAT IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
In a series of recent articles, Professor Eskridge has moved to bridge the gap
between social movement theory and constitutional law scholarship. In
producing legal histories of the civil rights movement, the women's rights
movement, and the gay rights movement, which Eskridge terms "identity-based
social movements," or "IBSMs," Eskridge found numerous parallels between each
of these movements. The similarities allowed him to develop a common
55. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 579-80.
57. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
58. Justice Scalia was dismayed by the "Court's surprising readiness to reconsider a decision
rendered a mere 17 years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586-87 (Scalia, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 562 (majority).
60. See e.g. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1046 ("Drawing from amicus briefs filed by the Cato Institute
and by several eminent historians of sexuality, Lawrence concluded that Hardwick reflected a poor job
of historical analysis."). See also Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2201 (hypothesizing that amicus briefs
provide "political and cultural signals to the Supreme Court that a civil rights complaint or defense has
merit from the perspective of a variety of allied groups or institutions").
61. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6; Eskridge, Channeling, supra n. 6; Eskridge, supra n. 51.
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conceptual framework for the constitutional progress of the three movements.62
Eskridge's primary interest with regard to these three movements is "how
movement lawyers translated the problems and aspirations of women and
minorities into constitutional discourse, and how their arguments fared., 63 While
setting forth that framework and critiquing it are far beyond the scope of this
modest essay, some of Eskridge's insights may be relevant to Indian legal
strategists.
For the Indian legal strategist, perhaps the most important question is one
that goes to the heart of the success of these movements: How did these three
identity-based social movements achieve such success in shaping constitutional
norms during the last century? According to Professor Eskridge, these
movements used various strategies to move the Supreme Court to adopt a more
favorable constitutional jurisprudence and ultimately to produce a "regime shift"
in constitutional law.64
Eskridge discussed three key strategies in particular. One strategy that
Eskridge characterizes as "naive" assumed that judges would neutrally apply the
law and, thus, entailed bringing cases in which even a skeptical but open-minded
judge would feel logically compelled to recognize minority rights within the
existing constitutional framework.65 Eskridge cites numerous criminal procedure
cases from the 1920s through the 1960s in which lawyers for black defendants
presented the Court with factually egregious cases that implicated the
constitutional purposes of preserving the rule of law in the face of an alternative
66that appeared to be an intolerable state of nature. Faced with outrageous facts,
judges from a variety of perspectives could agree with minority claims.67
In addition to the nafve strategy, each of the movements also used a more
sophisticated strategy that assumed that judges' decisions were influenced by their
own political preferences; this strategy sought to appeal to or mold those
preferences.6 In the 1930s, for example, civil rights lawyers were able to argue
that the deprivation of political rights was anathema to a pluralistic democracy
and more akin to totalitarianism or communism, making their arguments more
compelling even to the justices on the Court who might otherwise be least
sympathetic to minority rights.69 The effective use of libertarianism in Lawrence is
a dramatic demonstration of the power of this sophisticated strategy.70
Finally, each of the movements also used "cynical" strategies that presumed
that justices are partisan and that litigation is nothing more than politics in
62. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2062.
63. Id. at 2065.
64. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1027-32.
65. Id. at 1027-28.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1028.
68. Id.
69. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1028-29.
70. Eskridge notes that none of the justices in the majority would think of himself as an advocate of
any "homosexual agenda." Id. at 1024. In contrast, one or more of the justices might well be willing to
call himself an advocate for certain libertarian values expressed within the opinion.
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another forum." The "punch line for this strategy is to fight for your allies to be
appointed to the Court and to oppose appointment of known enemies. 72 As an
example of the success of this strategy, Eskridge notes that all four twentieth-
century judges nominated for the Supreme Court but defeated in a Senate vote
were opposed by the NAACP and allied groups."
Eskridge writes that each of the social movements employed the strategies in
different ways. For example, the women's rights movement ignored the naive
strategy of presenting case after egregious case and directly sought the landmark
ruling.74 He seems to believe that this strategy had its pitfalls; since Roe v. Wade75
was the result of a sudden legal avulsion rather than the gradual case-by-case
development of a constitutional regime, Roe has been much more difficult to
76digest than, say, Brown v. Board of Education, which followed dozens of cases
demonstrating the harms of official racism. As a result, Roe is not nearly as widely
accepted.77
One of the key findings of Eskridge's work is that legal strategies alone
cannot produce victories in the Supreme Court. Indeed, he attributes the success
of the gay rights movement in Lawrence v. Texas to the fact that the Supreme
Court's previous decision on the same subject, Bowers v. Hardwick, "stood in
direct tension with the new equilibrium in public opinion" '78 which was far more
tolerant of homosexuality. While public opinion rarely figures as an explicit or
prominent touchstone in opinions of the Supreme Court,79 Eskridge argues that
the strategies identified above have worked hand-in-hand with each movement's
public education campaign. In moving public opinion toward toleration and
acceptance of the social movements, the movements have placed the Court in the
position of either ruling in favor of the social movement or risk losing the "the
aura of neutrality that is essential for its legitimacy."
8
IV. INDIAN TRIBES AND IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Are tribes sufficiently comparable to the IBSMs to be able to profit from
their experiences? Tribes share some common attributes of Eskridge's social
movements, but they also exhibit key differences that make direct comparisons
difficult. One difference is that tribes simply began at a different place than the
71. Id. at 1029.
72. Id. at 1029.
73. Id. at 1029-30.
74. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2361-62.
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
77. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1069-71.
78. Id. at 1036.
79. But see e.g. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002) (noting that "the American public, legislators,
scholars, and iudges have deliberated over the question whether the death penalty should ever be
imposed on a mentally retarded criminal," and stating that "[t]he consensus reflected in those
deliberations informs" the decision in this case).
80. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1041.
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social movements; tribes had formal legal recognition long before women,
African-Americans, or gays. Even before this country's founding, tribal
sovereignty had long been recognized. Indeed, Indian tribes began their
American experience from a position of relative power and prestige, at least with
regard to the constitutional structure, having forced the weak federal government
to negotiate treaties or face potentially ruinous (and, at a minimum, very
expensive) wars.81 As a result, in contrast to these other movements, the tribal
sovereignty movement has long worked to preserve seemingly ever-shrinking
82tribal sovereign powers. Indeed, one might say that the tribal sovereignty
movement is not so much an affirmative movement as a defensive one.
Tribes also seek a fundamentally different result than the IBSMs. The civil
rights movement, the women's movement, and the gay rights movement seek full
and equal participation in American governance and society. They can cast their
arguments as pleas to participate more fully in an already pluralistic and
democratic government.83 In this way, their arguments appeal to fundamental
democratic ideals and flatter those who already exercise such rights. In contrast,
tribes do not necessarily seek greater participation in the American democratic
ideal through participation in federal and state governments. Tribes seek
primarily to preserve their right to a separate legal and governmental structure
within the geographic boundaries of the United States. In rejecting the American
governance and societal structure, and preferring their own, tribal arguments in
favor of separatism may be less appealing and, indeed, more threatening,
especially to those who have a near religious faith in the American democratic
system.
A couple of other distinctions are critical. The legal texts and instruments
used to achieve litigation successes and to force constitutional regime change for
the members of the civil rights, women's, and gay rights movements are inherently
oriented toward individuals and individual rights.84 These movements relied
heavily on First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection strategies.85
Moreover, in both the civil rights and women's movement cases, Professor
Eskridge finds a common substantive theory: "[iut is a theory about rationality in
public policy and about respecting the individuals in all groups actively
participating in the nation's pluralist politics." 86 He notes that the "norms that
gained traction in the twentieth century were based on democracy and
pluralism."87
81. See generally Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34
Ariz. St. L.J. 113 (2002).
82. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 436 U.S. 191 (1978).
83. Cf Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 2003 S. Ct. Rev.
357, 439 (2004) (casting Lawrence as an effort by Kennedy and O'Connor to provide "equal
citizenship" to gays and lesbians).
84. See e.g. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
85. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2072, 2193.
86. Id. at 2382.
87. Id. at 2375 (emphasis in original).
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A strong preference for a norm of individualism is reflected throughout
liberal political philosophy and American law.88 In contrast, tribal legal strategists
are focused on protecting communitarian values and the "group rights" of Indian
tribes.89 Even when those tribes themselves adopt individualistic legal regimes,
protecting the integrity of those regimes requires advocating for the rights of
tribes to define their own governmental systems in the way that each tribe deems
best. That is the essence of self-governance and it conflicts to some degree with
the norm of individualism that pervades American law.
In other respects, the narrative of the tribal sovereignty movement fits
cleanly into Professor Eskridge's framework for social movements. One can easily
describe a tribal experience with important similarities to the stages of
development of the social movements.9° After centuries of conflict that began
with European contact, the power of Indian tribes began to shrink in the early
years of the new American republic. Tribes sought protection of their treaty
rights in the courts. The response by the Supreme Court was perhaps as
Eskridge's study might have predicted, even though it occurred far earlier than the
cases he examined: the Court was sympathetic but ultimately was unwilling to
buck popular opinion in a meaningful way.9'
In his study, Eskridge used the early 1900s as his baseline start date ifor
studying each of the new social movements. 92 If one uses the same baseline start
date for tribes, other similarities emerge. Tribes were at their weakest in many
respects by the early 1900s. At the start of that century, tribes were fighting to
justify their existence and recognition as tribes at a time when the government
explicitly sought to undermine tribal governmental structures and communitarian
norms by converting individual Indians into farmers and individual landowners. 93
One of the achievements of that era was establishment of the right to American
citizenship for individual Indians.94 Indeed, African-Americans established the
right to be citizens and to vote long before American Indians. Despite the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was not thought to apply to Indian tribes,95
citizenship rights were not legally recognized for all Indians until 1924.
96
88. See generally Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential" Treatment, 49 UCLA L.
Rev. 943 (2002).
89. Id.
90. Professor Eskridge describes African Americans as "the social group most violently oppressed,
most dramatically resistant, and most tragically unsuccessful." Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2072.
With all due respect to African-Americans and their admittedly tragic history, Eskridge's descriptives
could apply with equal force to American Indians and tribes. The history of harm and discrimination
to Indians is compelling and familiar. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., Michie 1982). For more dramatic accounts, see e.g. Dee Brown, Bury
My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West (Holt, Rinehart, & Winston
1970); Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died For Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (2d ed., U. Okla. Press 1988).
91. See e.g. Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (essentially finding a right without a remedy).
92. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2069.
93. See generally Cohen, supra n. 90, at 128-29.
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000) (commonly referred to as the Citizenship Act of 1924).
95. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b).
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At several times throughout the century, tribes used an approach not unlike
Eskridge's "politics of recognition'" to preserve the legitimacy of their legal status
and to insure fair treatment and, eventually, remedies for past discrimination.
Like the other movements that Eskridge describes, Indian sovereignty has also
given rise to counter-movements. 9s For tribes the counter-movements continue to
be active; counter-movement members filed amicus briefs in the Lara case.99
In many ways, the tribes occupy a position perhaps most similar to that of
the gay rights movement. For example, in sheer numbers, neither Indians nor
gays account for any more than a tiny fraction of the voting population."0 Thus,
creating or protecting their rights solely through their own participation in the
democratic process is not likely to be an effective option. Moreover, there is little
or no direct constitutional text protecting their rights.1"' Given that at some level
of generality Indian tribes and social movements face the same fundamental
challenge (to wit: convincing the Supreme Court to adopt the constitutional
regime that will support their existence), it is useful to consider some of the very
practical insights that Eskridge draws from his careful look at the identity-based
social movements. Indian legal strategists may find Eskridge's findings as to the
successes of the social movements useful in informing their own litigation strategy
in the Supreme Court.
V. LESSONS ADAPTED FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Indian tribes have already adapted some of the same legal and political
strategies used by the social movements. Tribal use of the "naive" strategy of
bringing case after egregious case' °2 has occasionally succeeded in educating the
Supreme Court and producing victories by a sympathetic court willing to create
doctrine to recognize legal rights.'03 Moreover, very recently, tribes utilized the
"cynical" strategy by helping defeat the nomination of William G. Myers III to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for taking views opposing Indian tribes as
97. Eskridge, 1BSMs, supra n. 6, at 2065 (discussing the politics of recognition) (emphasis in
original).
98. See generally id. (discussing countermovements). For the gay rights movement, for example, the
counter-movement is characterized by those who claim to protect "traditional family values." Id. at
2161.
99. See supra nn. 14-21 and accompanying text (discussing anti-tribe briefs filed in the Lara case).
100. Karen MacPherson, American Indians Flex Political Muscle, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette A10 (Feb.
1, 2004) (available at http://www.post-gazette.comlpg/04032/268085.stm) (noting that there are an
estimated 1.5 million Indian voters, compared to the 100 million registered voters nationwide; but also
noting that Indian voters have increased clout in states with high concentrations of American Indians).
Gay voters are somewhat more difficult to quantify. However, the consensus appears to be that about
four million voters identify as gay. See e.g. David Paul Kuhn, GOP Grapples with Gay Unions,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/17/ politics/main618OO3.shtml (May 17, 2004).
101. Women and African-Americans have much more explicit support in the Constitution. See U.S.
Const. amend. XIV; U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
102. See supra nn. 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing the "naive" strategy).
103. One example of such doctrine is the trust responsibility. See e.g. U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206
(1983) (holding that statutes regarding timber management gave rise to an implicit fiduciary duty such
that Indians were entitled to money damages for the government's mismanagement of timber
resources).
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an Interior Department official. 1°4 Thus, whether they have intentionally copied
the social movements or not, tribes have used several of the same strategies that
the social movements have used.
The following are some insights that can be drawn from Eskridge's work on
social movements, adapted to fit the context of Indian law:
Tribes must mobilize broad public support and diminish public opposition if
they wish to prevail in the Supreme Court. A theme manifested throughout
Eskridge's work is that, even though the Court is not a democratic institution,
public opinion is relevant to the Court. To him, it is precisely the Court's need to
remain within the mainstream, at least as far as American cultural values are
concerned, that often motivates (and thus moderates) the Court. While the Court
may occasionally take positions that are not supported by an actual political
majority, it nevertheless may not wander too far. If the Court ventures too far
beyond the mainstream, it risks losing the "the aura of neutrality that is essential
for its legitimacy.' '10 5 Moreover, Eskridge asserts, the Court cannot "disrupt a
nationwide normative equilibrium on important political issues."1°6
Viewed in this way, political considerations become a two-edged sword. On
the one hand, the Court may occasionally be forced to moderate its views to move
back toward the range of normal public opinion, just as Eskridge asserts that it -did
in overruling Bowers and deciding Lawrence.'°7 On the other hand, however,
public opinion may occasionally be a limiting factor in the Court's effort to
venture forth and do justice. In other words, the Court's desire to stay within the
political mainstream may ultimately limit the Court's ability to do (unpopular)
justice.
To state these conclusions in a way that is relevant to Indian tribes, consider
the following: if an overwhelming majority of Americans think that Indian tribes
are an anachronism, the Court may find it more difficult to preserve tribal
authority. Thus, if tribes wish to preserve the Court's ability to rule in favor of
Indian tribes, they should focus on educating the broader American public about
the existence and the importance of Indian tribal governments. The concept of
Indian sovereignty must be made known to a wider audience than just educated
Indians and the handful of law students who have the insight to take an elective
Indian law course in law school. The recent effort in some states to include Indian
law questions on state bar exams is evidence of strategic thinking in motivating
108law students to educate themselves about Indian sovereignty. However, if
104. See e.g. Natl. Cong. of Am. Indians, Resolution #ABQ-03-061 (Nov. 21, 2003) (available at
http://www.ncai.org/data/docs/resolution/annual2003/03-061.pdf) (opposing the nomination of William
G. Myers III to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). Much of the credit in the media for Myers's
defeat went to environmental groups. One might legitimately question whether tribes could have
engineered Myers's defeat if they had been acting without the support of another broad-based and
powerful advocacy group.
105. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1041.
106. Id. at 1081.
107. See supra nn. 78-80 and accompanying text.
108. See e.g. New Mexico Includes American Indian Law on Bar Exams, http://www.lawschooll00.
comlindianlaw.htm (Apr. 1, 2002). See also Natl. Cong. of Am. Indians, Res. # MOH-04-001 (June 23,
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Eskridge's theory is accurate, it is only a very modest step. To reach the broad
audience that would be necessary to truly make a difference, all Americans must
begin to learn about tribal governments in elementary school, in middle school,
and in high school, when students are learning the other basic norms of American
government. Just as the civil rights movement worked to "change public norms
away from understanding racial variation (nonwhite) as malignant, toward
understanding racial variation as completely benign,"1°9 the tribal sovereignty
movement must change public norms to agree with the notion that allowing Indian
tribes to maintain their separate sovereign status makes America a richer place.
In other words, Americans must be educated in such a way that they are willing to
disregard the nearly overwhelming norm of assimilation characterized by the
American "melting pot," at least for Indian tribes. For some immigrant groups,
assimilation may be fine, and even encouraged, but for Indians, it means a certain
kind of deathO
At this point, the relevance of Eskridge's work for Indian tribes becomes
ironic. It suggests that activism in American politics and civic education may be a
necessary step for tribes to preserve their tribal separateness. In sum, tribes must
engage the American political system to maintain their separation from it.
Because participation in democratic processes of American government is an
inherently assimilative activity, tribes may win the battle but lose the war.
Nevertheless, it may be the only way to fight within a democratic forum.
At a time when Indian legal strategists have sometimes debated whether to
pursue a congressional strategy or a Supreme Court strategy, and have at least
temporarily agreed that Congress is a better forum than the Supreme Court for
tribal issues, the reality is that the distinction between the two may not be as great
as one might think. The strategy for achieving success in the Supreme Court may
be similar to the strategy for achieving success in Congress.
The party with the most amicus briefs usually wins. This insight is a corollary
to the public opinion principle enunciated above. Professor Eskridge's research,
which covers a half-century of Supreme Court cases, indicates that the party with
the most amicus briefs usually wins the case." He hypothesizes that amicus briefs
provide "political and cultural signals to the Supreme Court that a civil rights
2004) (available at http://www.ncai.org/data/docs/resolution/midyear2004/04-001.pdf) (noting that New
Mexico began including Indian law questions in 2002, asserting NCAI's support for efforts in
Washington and Idaho to include Indian law questions on their bar exams, and requesting other states
to do so as well); Bar Adds Indian Law to Exam, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Oct. 23, 2004) (available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/196549_barexam23.html).
109. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1029.
110. In a recent conversation, scholar Philip S. Deloria expressed the insight that traditionally we
have not worried about losing the culture of immigrants because they can always look back to their
home country if they want to revisit their culture. Since the tribes generally live in their own
traditional lands, Indian tribal culture will be lost if it is not maintained here. There is no home
country to which tribes can go to find their cultures. Author's notes from discussion with Philip S.
Deloria (Sept. 11, 2004) (copy on file with author).
111. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2200. Eskridge's review of Supreme Court cases since the New
Deal indicates that the side with the most amicus briefs wins in two out of three cases. He notes
surprisingly that the side with the higher number of amicus briefs prevails more often than the side
with the Solicitor General. Id.
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complaint or defense has merit from the perspective of a variety of allied groups
or institutions." 112 Conventional wisdom regarding the Michigan affirmative
action cases' 13 supports this analysis; the amicus brief filed by high-ranking
military officers in favor of affirmative action was helpful because it signaled
broad support for affirmative action as an important national policy.114 Likewise,
a brief filed in Lawrence by the American Bar Association demonstrated that 81
of the 100 largest law firms in the United States had adopted policies specifically
forbidding employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. 15
In Lara, each party garnered the support of four amicus briefs, but the Idaho
brief, which was filed nominally in support of the United States, was clearly
contrary to the interest of tribes.116 So, other than the brief of the United States,
the tribal position was a minority one, representing three amicus briefs, to the
opponents' five.'17 The tribal position prevailed partially because of the presence
of the Solicitor General and the fact that the coordinated briefing by the tribal
parties was of far higher quality than the briefing for the opposition." 8 One lesson
from Lara is that Indian tribes must work to file merits and amicus briefs that
Supreme Court justices will read. Supreme Court justices live a fairly cloistered
existence. They spend most of the year in Washington. Most of them have spent
little or no time on Indian reservations and have little understanding of tribal
governments." 9 Presumably, much of what they know about Indian reservations
is learned from Supreme Court briefs. The briefing strategy in Lara, including the
hiring of sophisticated and experienced Supreme Court counsel,' 20 reflects that
Indian legal strategists are aware of the need to speak to justices in their own
language and through voices they are accustomed to hearing.
112. Id. at 2201.
113. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
114. See Br. of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (noting,
for example, that some form of affirmative action is necessary to keep the military diverse, and
asserting that diversity in the military is necessary for its success).
115. Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. Bar Assn. at 10 n. 6, Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472; see Karst, supra n. 83,
at 439 (casting Lawrence as an effort by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor to provide "equal citizenship"
to gays and lesbians).
116. See Idaho Br., supra n. 17.
117. Supra nn. 14, 17, 24, 33-34 and accompanying text (listing the respective briefs for each side).
118. Whereas the briefs in support of the tribal position were carefully coordinated, most of the
briefs for the opposition were not. Notably, CERF, the Counties, and the Morris family are all
interconnected. Their filing of three separate briefs makes the opposition look more substantial than it
was in reality. The Morris Brief is an effective demonstration of poor quality. The Mortises' stated
interest as amici is that one of them was convicted of speeding in the tribal court of a tribe not his own,
and they believed the conviction was not fair. Yet their case does not include a second federal
prosecution, so it is not very similar at all to the Lara case, and its outcome would not be different
regardless of the result in the Lara case.
119. However, in July of 2001, Justices Breyer and O'Connor did visit reservations and their tribal
courts in Arizona and Washington, as well as meet with tribal court judges in Reno, Nevada. See
Native American Rights Fund, Case Updates: Two U.S. Supreme Court Justices Visit Tribal Courts, 26
NARF Leg. Rev. No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2001) (available at http://www.narf.org/pubs/nlr/nlr26-2.htm).
120. See supra nn. 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing the strategy used in Lara).
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Tribes must also reach out to allies. Tribes have realized the importance of
appealing to state governments to join them in their legal arguments. 121 Based on
the Lawrence experience, tribes might agree that other groups should be
cultivated as allies. Just as the gay rights movement obtained the support of the
CATO Institute22 and successfully caused splintering in the "conservative" wing
of the Supreme Court, tribes need to be strategic in appealing to the particular
doctrinal tastes of each justice by appealing to groups that share like views.
In light of Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lara, one theory might be to
cultivate conservative law and policy groups that advocate in favor of a federal
government of enumerated powers. Indeed, though the social movements
benefited from dynamic constitutional interpretation as characterized by a "living
constitution," such dynamism has often hurt tribes.' 2' When Chief Justice John
Marshall created a federal common law for Indian nations that was unmoored
from constitutional principles,' he departed dramatically from principles that
many strict constructionists hold dear, especially the notion that the federal
government is one of limited and defined powers.'25 Some of the Court's early
work gave rise to an entire Indian law jurisprudence that is adrift from the
Constitution.126 Thus, for tribes, originalist constitutional interpretation, which
seems to be alive and well, 27 might well be the preferable approach.' 28 A rigorous
application of the doctrine of enumerated powers and a careful reading of the
Indian Commerce Clause would, as my colleague Professor Saikrishna Prakash
has recently explained, result in a diminishment of federal "plenary power" over
at least some tribes:129 "What is good for Alfonso Lopez is good for the Apache
Tribe."' 3
121. Supra n. 35 and accompanying text.
122. Supra nn. 54, 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing the CATO Br.).
123. See generally Phillip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary:
The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 5 (2002).
124. Three cases popularly known as "The Marshall Trilogy" form the bedrock of federal Indian law.
Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1; Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543
(1823).
125. See e.g. The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison).
126. See e.g. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
127. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2363-64 (noting that "originalist work has grown like weeds in a
vacant lot"); see also id. at 2366 ("Yet originalism lives. And flourishes."). Eskridge is a strong critic of
original meaning jurisprudence. Once social normative or economic issues have changed in ways that
affect an issue, he finds it virtually impossible, for a variety of reasons, to reconstruct the original
meaning of a constitutional text. First, the context is unknowable and "law office history" cannot
effectively reconstruct that context to understand the full texture of the meaning of the words at the
time of their drafting. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1046. Second, the framers understood that their
purposes would be pursued differently when social, economic or normative circumstances changed and
it is a "mind game" to try to figure out which of the purposes the founders would have blessed and
which they would have rejected. And, finally, the founders had certain fundamental views that are
viewed today as "morally squalid." Id. at 1048-50. How should an originalist consider these views in
creating that broader context with which to understand original meaning?
12& Cf. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1641-48 (Thomas, J., concurring).
129. Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069, 1105-15 (2004).
130. Id. at 1108 (citing Lopez v. U.S., 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School
Zones Act was beyond the Commerce Clause authority of Congress and thus determining that Mr.
Lopez's conviction under that Act was invalid)).
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Viewed from this perspective, Lara illustrates a problem. Even though Lara
was a victory in an immediate sense, it moves tribes further down a doctrinal dead
end if the ultimate goal is a return to the constitutionally-envisaged role for Indian
tribes.' Lara was a vindication of the view that tribal sovereignty continues to
exist at the whim of the United States. In other words, while Eskridge has
explained how to achieve a regime shift, it may be that tribes need to achieve a
paradigm shift,'132  a revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, change in
constitutional law.
Indians must be more visible at the Supreme Court. Eskridge believes that a
cause in fact of the Lawrence decision was that "[e]verywhere the Justices turned,
there were openly lesbian and gay attorneys, law professors, citizens-and (gasp!)
even law clerks within their own building. Everywhere the Justices went in the
world, people asked them how they could demonize gay people.' '133 In other
words, though the justices of the Supreme Court are not formally accountable to
an electorate, they are accountable and educable in their daily personal
interactions with other human beings.
While Eskridge's insight is heartening because it recognizes that justices are
human beings and subject to the same influences as the rest of us, it demonstrates
a serious problem for Indian tribes. Though gay and lesbian people have broken
into the highest levels of government and society, Indians have rarely cracked the
door to the most important institutions. Although hundreds of Indians have
become attorneys in the last three decades, no Indian has ever been a Supreme
Court Justice, and apparently no Indian has ever served as a Supreme Court clerk.
Few Indians have ever served on any of the lower federal courts. The absence of
any Indians encountering Supreme Court justices in their daily lives or through
professional associations highlights the importance of making Indians visible at
the Supreme Court in other ways, such as occasional protests at the Court, and of
continuing to press for the hiring of an Indian as a clerk (at least) at the Supreme
Court. 1
Since Indian tribes are loathe to bring cases to the Supreme Court in light of
the Court's recent track record,'35 Indian tribes risk becoming less visible there.
Given Eskridge's point that the civil rights movement prevailed at least in part by
'36
using a strategy of educating the Court by bringing case after egregious case,
Indian tribes may well be at a disadvantage if they lose visibility in the Court by
131. At least as some have suggested that it was envisaged. See e.g. Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the
Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 217, 256-58
(1992).
132. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3d ed., U. Chicago Press 1996)
(describing a "paradigm shift" as something much greater than mere incremental shifts from one
regime to another and more akin to a radical reordering of the regime).
133. Eskridge, supra n. 51, at 1036.
134. See supra n. 128. Given the insight into Indian law that Justice Thomas showed in his Lara
concurrence (and the likelihood that he will be on the bench for decades to come), an Indian would
likely find an interesting and fruitful experience clerking for Justice Thomas.
135. Supra n. 29 (giving some examples of recent Supreme Court cases).
136. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2357.
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not bringing cases. Indeed, there may be some purchase to the notion that
education is key to favorable treatment in the Supreme Court, even for Indian
tribes. Consider the more recent votes by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, for
example, both of whom have ruled in favor of tribes more often in more recent
years than they ever did in the past. This may reflect the view that they are more
comfortable with tribal sovereignty now that they understand it better. Justices
are like most lawyers in that they do not necessarily have wide experience with
Indian law. For many of them, their first experience with Indian law may well be
when they reach the Court. The notion that there are three sovereigns in the
United States, rather than two (just the federal government and states), may be
hard to swallow on first encounter. For those not educated about it in high school
government class, it may take a little while for such a concept to take a firm place
within one's worldview. One way tribes can steer this sort of education is, as in
Lara, presenting cases to the Supreme Court in which tribal governments are
behaving as responsible governments, by providing services to their constituents,
in circumstances where they are the only governments that can effectively provide
such services.137
VI. CONCLUSION
Lara was an unexpected victory obtained largely through savvy lawyering.
One implication of Eskridge's work, though, is that good lawyering is not enough.
As Indian legal strategists consider some of the larger and smaller points made by
Eskridge in his study of social movements, they will likely find that Indian tribes
cannot use the substantive path well trodden by the civil rights and women's
movements. The legal principles that support tribal sovereignty are radically
different than those that support individual rights for African-Americans, women,
and gays. While these movements relied heavily on individual rights protected by
the First Amendment, due process, and equal protection,138 tribes have relied most
heavily on tribal sovereignty, a concept that is not grounded within constitutional
text, but at best exists by inference from constitutional text. A key difference is
that Indian tribes seek the preservation of group rights, which may well be
fundamentally inconsistent with the individual rights protections sought by these
other movements.!39 Because tribes face a different constitutional landscape than
these social movements, they cannot simply cut and paste the arguments used by
these other groups.
Though the substantive arguments of these other movements may not be
particularly helpful to tribes, tribes should consider the practical lessons of the
social movements in formulating positions before the Supreme Court. Tribes can
137. This approach is certainly not foolproof. In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Navajo Nation
attempted to justify the need for a tax on non-Indians by showcasing, for example, the fire protection
services that the tribe provided to the facilities where the tax was levied. 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Though
the tribe lost the case, it may nevertheless have had an educational influence on the Court and the
public.
138. Eskridge, IBSMs, supra n. 6, at 2072, 2193.
139. See Carole Goldberg, supra n. 88, at 983-85.
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use many of the practical lessons that Eskridge highlights. They must heed the
broader lesson that public opinion is also a relevant forum. They should seek
support for their positions through amicus briefs from a broad range of public
interest groups. And they must continue, as they did in Lara, to develop a more
sophisticated approach to litigation in the Supreme Court.
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